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Abstract 
This paper investigates value function approx­
imation in the context of zero-sum Markov 
games, which can be viewed as a generalization 
of the Markov decision process (MDP) frame­
work to the two-agent case. We generalize er­
ror bounds from MDPs to Markov games and 
describe generalizations of reinforcement learn­
ing algorithms to Markov games. We present 
a generalization of the optimal stopping prob­
lem to a two-player simultaneous move Markov 
game. For this special problem, we provide 
stronger bounds and can guarantee convergence 
for LSTD and temporal difference learning with 
linear value function approximation. We demon­
strate the viability of value function approxima­
tion for Markov games by using the Least squares 
policy iteration (LSPI) algorithm to learn good 
policies for a soccer domain and a flow control 
problem. 
1 Introduction 
Markov games can be viewed as generalizations of both 
classical game theory and the Markov decision process 
(MDP) framework1. In this paper, we consider the two­
player zero-sum case, in which two players make simulta­
neous decisions in the same environment with shared state 
information. The reward function and the state transition 
probabilities depend on the current state and the current 
agents' joint actions. The reward function in each state is 
the payoff matrix of a zero-sum game. 
Many practical problem can be viewed as Markov games, 
including military-style pursuit-evasion problems. More­
over, many problems that are solved as classical games 
1 Littman (1994) notes that the Markov game framework actu­
ally preceded the MOP framework. 
by working in strategy space may be represented more ef­
fectively as Markov games. A well-known example of a 
Markov game is Littman's soccer domain (Littman, 1994). 
Recent work on learning in games has emphasized accel­
erating learning and exploiting opponent suboptimalities 
(Bowling & Veloso, 2001). The problem of learning in 
games with very large state spaces using function approx­
imation has not been a major focus, possibly due to the 
perception that a prohibitively large number of linear pro­
grams would need to be solved during learning. 
This paper contributes to the theory and practice of learning 
in Markov games. On the theoretical side, we generalize 
some standard bounds on MDP performance with approxi­
mate value functions to Markov games. When presented in 
their fully general form, these tum out to be straightforward 
applications of known properties of contraction mappings 
to Markov games. 
We also generalize the optimal stopping problem to the 
Markov game case. Optimal stopping is a special case of 
an MDP in which states have only two actions: continue 
on the current Markov chain, or exit and receive a (possi­
bly state dependent) reward. Optimal stopping is of inter­
est because it can be used to model the decision problem 
faced by the holder of stock options (and is purportedly 
modeled as such by financial institutions). Moreover, lin­
ear value function approximation algorithms can be used 
for these problems with guaranteed convergence and more 
compelling error bounds than those obtainable for generic 
MDPs. We extend these results to a Markov game we call 
the "opt-out", in which two players must decide whether 
to remain in the game or opt out, with a payoff that is de­
pendent upon the actions of both players. For example, this 
can be used to model the decision problem faced by two 
"partners" who can choose to continue participating in a 
business venture, or force a sale and redistribution of the 
business assets. 
As in the case of MDPs, these theoretical results are some­
what more motivational than practical. They provide re­
assurance that value function approximation architectures 
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which can represent value functions with reasonable er­
rors will lead to good policies. However, as in the MDP 
case, they do not provide a priori guarantees of good per­
formance. Therefore we demonstrate, on the practical side 
of this paper, that with a good value function approximation 
architecture, we can achieve good performance on large 
Markov games. We achieve this by extending the least 
squares policy iteration (LSPI) algorithm (Lagoudakis & 
Parr, 2001), originally designed for MDPs, to general two­
player zero-sum Markov games. LSPI is an approximate 
policy iteration algorithm that uses linear approximation 
architectures, makes efficient use of training samples, and 
learns faster than conventional learning methods. The ad­
vantage of using LSPI for Markov games stems from its 
generalization ability and its data efficiency. The latter is 
of even greater importance for large Markov Games than 
for MDPs since each learning step is not light weight; it 
requires solving a linear program. 
We demonstrate LSPI with value function approximation 
in two domains: Littman's soccer domain in which LSPI 
learns very good policies using a relatively small num­
ber of sample "random games" for training; and, a simple 
server/router flow control problem where the optimal pol­
icy is found easily with a small number of training samples. 
2 Markov Games 
A two-player zero-sum Markov game is defined as a 6-
tuple (S, A, 0, P, n, 'f'), where: s = { S), 82, . . .  , Sn } is a 
finite set of game states; A = {a 1, a2, ... , am} and 0 = 
{ o1, o2, ... , o!} are finite sets of actions, one for each player; 
Pis a Markovian state transition model- P(s, a, o, s') is 
the probability that s' will be the next state of the game 
when the players take actions a and o respectively in state 
s; n is a reward (or cost) function- R(s, a, o) is the ex­
pected one-step reward for taking actions a and o in state 
s; and, 'Y E (0, 1] is the discount factor for future rewards. 
We will refer to the first player as the "agent," and the sec­
ond player as the "opponent." Note that if the opponent is 
permitted only a single action, the Markov game becomes 
an MDP. 
A policy 1r for a player in a Markov game is a mapping, 
1r : S --+ O(A), which yields probability distributions over 
the agent's actions for each state in S. Unlike MDPs, the 
optimal policy for a Markov game may be stochastic, i.e., 
it may define a mixed strategy for every state. By conven­
tion, 1r( s) denotes the probability distribution over actions 
in states and 1r(s, a) denotes the probability of action a in 
states. 
The agent is interested in maximizing its expected, dis­
counted return in the minimax sense, that is, assuming the 
worst case of an optimal opponent. Since the underlying 
rewards are zero-sum, it is sufficient to view the opponent 
as acting to minimize the agent's return. Thus, the state 
value function for a zero-sum Markov game can be defined 
in a manner analogous to the Bellman equation for MDPs: 
V(s) = max min L Q(s,a,o)1r(s,a) , (1) 
rr(s)E!"l(A) oEO aEA 
where the Q-values familiar to MDPs are now defined over 
states and pairs of agent and opponent actions: 
Q(s, a, o) = R(s, a, o) + 'Y L P(s, a, o, s')V(s') . (2) 
s'ES 
We will refer to the policy chosen by Eq. (I) as the minimax 
policy with respect to Q. This policy can be determined in 
any state s by solving the following linear program: 
Maximize: V(s) 
Subject to: L 1r(s, a) = 1 
aEA 
'ria E A, 1r(s, a) 2: 0 
'rio E 0, V(s) � L Q(s,a,o)1r(s,a) 
aEA 
In many ways, it is useful to think of the above linear pro­
gram as a generalization of the max operator for MDPs 
(this is also the view taken by Szepesvari and Littman 
(1999)). We briefly summarize some of the properties of 
operators for Markov games which are analogous to oper­
ators for MDPs. (See Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1996) for 
an overview.) Eq. (I) and Eq. (2) have fixed points V* and 
Q*, respectively, for which the minimax policy is optimal 
in the minimax sense. The following iteration, which we 
name with operator T*, converges to Q*: 
T* : Q(i+ll(s, a, o) = R(s, a, o) + 
! L P(s,a,o,s') max min L QUl(s,a,o)7r(s,a) 
s'ES 
rr(s)E!"!(A) oEO aEA 
This is analogous to value iteration in the MDP case. 
For any policy 1r, we can define Q rr ( s, a, o) as the expected, 
discounted reward when following policy 1r after taking ac­
tions a and o for the first step. The corresponding fixed 
point equation for Qrr and operator Trr are: 
Trr: Q(i+l)(s,a,o) = R(s,a,o) + 
'Y '"""' P(s,a,o,s')min '"""' Q(i)(s,a,o)1r(s,a) � oEO� 
s'ES aEA 
A policy iteration algorithm can be implemented for 
Markov games in a manner analogous to policy iteration 
for MDPs by fixing a policy 7r;, solving for Qrr,, choosing 
1ri+1 as the minimax policy with respect to Qrr, and iterat­
ing. This algorithm will also converge to Q*. 
3 Value Function Approximation 
Value function approximation has played an important role 
in extending the classical MDP framework to solve practi­
cal problems. W hile we are not yet able to provide strong 
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a priori guarantees in most cases for the performance of 
specific value function architectures on specific problems, 
careful analyses such as (Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1996) have 
legitimized the use of value function approximation for 
MDPs by providing loose guarantees that good value func­
tions approximations will result in good policies. 
Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1996) note that "the Neuro­
Dynamic Programming (NDP) methodology with cost-to­
go function approximation is not very well developed at 
present for dynamic games"2 (page 416). To our knowl­
edge, this section of the paper provides the first error 
bounds on the use of approximate value functions for 
Markov games. We achieve these results by first stating 
extremely general results about contraction mappings and 
then showing that known error bound results for MDPs 
generalize to Markov games as a result. 3. 
An operator T is a contraction with rate a with respect to 
some norm 11·11 if there exists a real number a E [0, 1) such 
that for all vl and v2: 
An operator T is a non-expansion if 
The residual of a vector V with respect to some operator T 
and norm II · II is defined as 
Ey(V) = IITV - VII 
Lemma 3.1 Let T be a contraction mapping in II · II with 
rate a and fixed point V*. Then, 
IIV* - VII 
� Ey(V) 
. 
1-a 
This lemma is verified easily using the triangle inequality 
and contraction property ofT. 
Lemma 3.2 Let 7j and 72 be contraction mappings in 11·11 
with rates a1. a2 (respectively) and fixed points Vt and V2* 
(respectively). Then, 
I IV:* _ V*ll < 
£71 (V) + <T2(V) 1 2 - 1 , -Q3 
This result follows immediately from the triangle inequal­
ity and the previous lemma. A convenient and relatively 
well-known property of Markov games is that operators 
T* and T" are contractions in II · lloo with rate/. where 
2NDP is their term for value function approximation. 
3We thank Michael Littman for pointing out that these results 
should also apply to all generalized MOPs (Szepesvari & Littman, 
1999) 
IIVIIoo = maxsES IV(s)l (Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1996). 
The convergence of value iteration for both Markov games 
and MDPs follows immediately from this result. 
Theorem 3.3 Let Q* be the optimal Q function for a 
Markov game with value iteration operator T*. 
II Q*-Qll 
� Ey
.
(Q) . 
1-, 
This result follows directly from Lemma 3.1 and the con­
traction property of T*. While it gives us a loose bound 
on how far we are from the true value function, it doesn't 
answer the more practical question of how the policy corre­
sponding to a suboptimal value function performs in com­
parison to the optimal policy. We now generalize results 
from Williams and Baird (1993) to achieve the following 
bound: 
Theorem 3.4 Let Q* be the optimal Q function for a 
Markov game and T* be the value iteration operator for 
this game. If 1r is the minimax policy with respect to Q, 
then 
This result follows directly from Lemma 3.2 by noting that 
£p is identical to £y. at this point. As noted by Baird and 
Williams the result can be tightened by a factor of 1 by ob­
serving that for the next iteration, T* and T" are identical. 
Since this bound is tight for MDPs, it is necessarily tight 
for Markov games. 
The significance of these results is more motivational than 
practical. As in the MDP case, the impact of small approx­
imation errors can, in the worst case, be quite large. More­
over, it is essentially impossible in practice to compute the 
residual for large state spaces and, therefore, impossible to 
compute a bound for an actual Q function. As with MDPs, 
however, these results can motivate the use of value func­
tion approximation techniques. 
4 Approximation in Markov Game 
Algorithms 
Littman (1994) studied Markov games as a framework for 
multiagent reinforcement learning (RL) by extending tab­
ular Q-learning to a variant called minimax-Q. By view­
ing the maximization in Eq. (1) as a generalized max op­
eration (Szepesvari & Littman, 1999) minimax-Q simply 
uses Eq. (1) in place of the traditional max operator in Q­
learning. The rub is that minimax-Q must therefore solve 
one linear program for every experience sampled from the 
environment. We note that in the case of Littman's 4 x 5 
soccer domain, 106 learning steps were used4, which im-
4It's not clear that this many were needed; but this was the 
duration the training period. 
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plies that 106 linear programs were solved. Even though 
the linear programs were small, this adds further motiva­
tion to the desire to increase learning efficiency through the 
use of value function approximation. 
In the natural formulation of Q-learning with value func­
tion approximation for MDPs, a tabular Q-function is re-
placed by a parameterized Q-function, Q(s, a, w ), where 
w is some set of parameters describing our approximation 
architecture, e.g., a neural network or a polynomial. The 
update equation for a transition from state s to state s' with 
action a and reward r then becomes: 
w � w+a (r+oy maxQ(s',a',w) -Q(s,a,w)) 'i7wQ(s,a,w), r�1EA 
where Q is the learning rate. 
One could easily extend this approximate Q-learning al­
gorithm to Markov games by defining the Q-functions 
over states and agent-opponent action pairs, and replac­
ing the max operator in the update equation with the min­
imax operator of Eq. (1 ). This approach would yield the 
same stability and performance guarantees of ordinary Q­
learning with function approximation, that is, essentially 
none. Also, it would require solving a very large number 
of linear programs to learn a good policy. In the following 
two sections, we separately address both of these concerns: 
stable approximation and efficient learning. 
5 Stable Approximation 
A standard approach to proving the stability of a function 
approximation scheme is to exploit the contraction prop­
erties of the update operator T. If a function approxima­
tion step can be shown to be non-expansive in the same 
norm in which T is a contraction, then the combined up­
date/approximation step remains a contraction. This ap­
proach is used by Gordon (1995), who shows that a general 
approximation architecture called an averager can be used 
for stable value function approximation in MDPs. This and 
similar results generalize immediately to the Markov game 
case and may prove useful for continuous space Markov 
games, such as pursuit-evasion problems. 
In our limited space, we choose to focus on an architecture 
for which the analysis is somewhat trickier: linear approx­
imation architectures. Evaluation of a fixed policy for an 
MDP is known to converge when the value function is ap­
proximated by a linear architecture (Van Roy, 1998). Two 
such stable approaches are least-squares temporal differ­
ence (LSTD) learning (Bradtke & Barto, 1996) and linear 
temporal difference (TD) learning (Sutton, 1988). In these 
methods the value function V is approximated by a linear 
combination of basis functions </>i: 
k 
V(s,w) = I>Pi(s)wi = <f>(s)Tw i=l 
We briefly review the core of the convergence results and 
error bounds for linear value function approximation and 
the optimal stopping problem. We can view the approxi­
mation as alternating between dynamic programming steps 
with operator T and projection S_!eps with operator II, in 
an attempt to find the fixed point V (and the corresponding 
w): 
If the operator T is a contraction and II is a non-expansion 
in the same norm in which T is a contraction, then w is 
well-defined and iterative methods such as value iteration 
or temporal difference learning will converge to w. For 
linear value function approximation, if the transition model 
P yields a mixing process with stationary distribution p, T 
is a contraction in the weighted Lz norm II · II P (Van Roy, 
1998), where 
( ) 1 /2 
IIVIIP = I>(s)V(s)2 
sES 
If IIp is an orthogonal projection weighted by p, then w is 
well-defined, since a projection in any weighted £2 norm is 
necessarily non-expansive in that norm. Using matrix and 
vector notation, we have 
<I>= <f>(s )T 
( q\(s1 )T ) 
q\( 81SI )T 
, 
and w can be defined in closed form as the result of the 
linear Bellman operator combined with orthogonal projec-
tion: 
w = (<PT(ip- /'PiP))-1 ipT'R. . 
The LSTD algorithm solves directly for w, while linear TD 
finds w by stochastic approximation. 
Since w is found by orthogonal projection, the Pythagorean 
theorem can be used to bound the distance from V to the 
true value function V*(Van Roy, 1998): 
In general, these algorithms are not guaranteed to work for 
optimization problems. Linear TD can diverge if a max 
operator is introduced and LSTD is not suitable for the pol­
icy evaluation stage of a policy iteration algorithm (Koller 
& Parr, 2000). However, these algorithms can be applied 
to the problem of optimal stopping and an alternating game 
version of the optimal stopping problem(Van Roy, 1998). 
Optimal stopping can be used to model the problem of 
when to sell an asset or how to price an option. The sys­
tem evolves as an uncontrolled Markov chain because the 
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actions of an individual agent cannot affect the evolution 
of the system. This characterization is true of individual 
investors in stock or commodity markets. The only actions 
are stopping actions, which correspond to jumping off the 
Markov chain and receiving a reward which is a function of 
the state. For example, selling a commodity is equivalent 
to jumping off the Markov chain and receiving a reward 
equivalent to the current price of the commodity. 
We briefly review a proof of convergence for linear func­
tion approximation for the optimal stopping problem. Let 
the operator T, be the dynamic programming operator for 
the continuation of the process: 
T,: V(t+tl(s) = Rc(s) + I'  2:: P(s'ls)v<tl(s') , 
s1ES 
where Rc is the reward function associated with continuing 
the process. We can define the stopping operator to be: 
where Rh is the reward associated with stopping at state 
s. The form of value iteration for the optimal stopping 
problem with linear value function approximation is thus: 
V(t+l) = II/lh T, V(t) and the combined operation will 
have a well-defined fixed point if Th is non-expansive in 
ll·llp· 
Lemma 5.1 If an operator T is pointwise non-expansive 
then it is non-expansive in any weigthed L2 norm. 
It is easy to see that the maximum operation in the opti­
mal stopping problem has this property: I max( c, V1 ( s)) -
max(c, V2(s))l:::; IV1(s)- V2(s)l , which implies 117/Y!­
T, V2ll p :::; IIV1 - V2ll p for any p weighted L2 norm. 
We now present a generalization of the optimal stopping 
problem to Markov games. We call this the "opt-out" 
problem, in which two players must decide whether to 
continue along a Markov chain with Bellman operator T, 
and reward Rc, or adopt one of several possible exit­
ing actions a 1  ... ai, and o 1  ... Oj. For each combination 
of agent and opponent actions, the game will terminate 
with probability Ph ( s, a, o) and continue with probability 
1 - Ph(s, a, o). If the game terminates, the agent will re­
ceive reward Rh ( s, a, o) and the opponent will receive re­
ward -Rh(s, a, o). Otherwise, the game continues. This 
type of game can be used to model the actions of two part­
ners with buy-out options. If both choose to exercise their 
buy-out options at the same time, a sale and redistribution 
of the assets may be forced. If only one partner chooses to 
exercise a buy-out option, the assets will be distributed in 
a potentially uneven way, depending upon the terms of the 
contract and the type of buy-out action exercised. Thus, the 
decision to exercise a buy-out option will depend upon the 
actions of the other partner, and the expected, discounted 
value of future buy-out scenarios.5 
The operator 7/, is then defined as the follows: 
7/,: V(t+ll(s) = maxmin '\' (Ph(s,a,o)Rh(s,a,o) + 
11" oEO � 
aEA 
(1 - Ph(s,a,o))V(t)(s))1r(s,a) 
which we solve with the following linear program 
Maximize: V(s) 
Subject to: 2:: 1r(s, a) = 1 
a 
'ria E A, 1r(s,a) 2': 0 
'rio E 0, V(s):::; l:(Ph(s,a,o)Rh(s,a,o) 
+(1 - h(s, a, o))V(t)(s))1r(s, a) 
(3) 
Theorem 5.2 The operator Th for the opt-out game is a 
non-expansion in any weighted L2 norm. 
Proof: Consider two value functions, V1 and V2, with 
IIV1 - V2ll = = E. We show that 7/, is pointwise non­
expansive, which implies that it is a non-expansion in any 
weighted L2 norm by LemmaS.!. We will write the coeffi­
cients of the linear program constraint forTh with opponent 
action k and value function V1 as 0� and the corresponding 
constraint for value function V2 as 0�. The corresponding 
constraints can then be expressed in terms of a dot product, 
e.g., for V1(s) we get V(s) :::; 0� · 1r(s), where 1r(s) is a 
vector of probabilities for each action. 
Assume IV1(s)-V2(s)l = E. This implies 110� - C?�II=:::; 
E, Vk. We will call v1 the minimax solution for 7/, V1 (with 
policy 1r 1) and call v2 the minimax solution for 7/, V2 (with 
policy 1r 2. We must show I v1 - v2l :::; E. In the following, 
we will use the fact that there must exist at least one tight 
constraint on V and we define j to be the minimizing oppo­
nent action in the second summation in the second line be­
low. We also assume, without loss of generality, v1 > v2. 
min 0� · 1r1 - min 0� · 1r2 
k k 
min 0� · 71'"1 - min 0� · 1r1 
k k 
min 0� . 7rj - o; . 7rj 
k 
o{ . 1r1 - o; . 1r1 
(Oi- o;). 1r1 
€. I 
5The opt-out game described here is different from a Quitting 
Game (Solan & Vieille, 2001) in several ways. It is more limited 
in that it is just two-player and zero-sum, not n-player and gen­
eral sum. It is more general, in that that both players are moving 
along a Markov chain in which different payoff matrices may be 
associated with each state. 
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The error bounds and convergence results for the optimal 
stopping version of linear TD and LSTD all generalize to 
the opt-out game as immediate corollaries of this result.6 
6 Efficient Learning in Markov Games 
The previous section described some specific cases where 
value function approximation is convergent for Markov 
games. As with MDPs, we may be tempted to use a learn­
ing method with weaker guarantees to attack large, generic 
Markov games. In this section, we demonstrate good per­
formance using value function approximation for Markov 
games. While the stronger convergence results of the pre­
vious section do not apply here, the general results of Sec­
tion 3 do, as well as the generic approximation policy iter­
ation bounds from (Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1996). 
A limitation of Q-learning with function approximation is 
that it often requires many training samples. In the case 
of Markov games this would require solving a large num­
ber of linear programs. This would lead to slow learning, 
which would slow down the iterative process by which the 
designer of the value function approximation architecture 
selects features (basis functions). In contrast to Q-learning, 
LSPI (Lagoudakis & Parr, 2001) is a learning algorithm 
that makes very efficient use of data and converges faster 
than conventional methods. This makes LSPI well-suited 
to value function approximation in Markov games as it has 
the potential of reducing the number of linear programs re­
quired to be solved. We briefly review the LSPI framework 
and describe how it extends to Markov games. 
LSPI is a model-free approximate policy iteration algo­
rithm that learns a good policy for any MDP from a corpus 
of stored samples taken from that MDP. LSPI works with 
Q-functions instead of V-functions. The Q" function for a 
policy 1r is approximated by a linear combination of basis 
functions ¢>i (features) defined over states and actions: 
k 
Q-rr(s, a, w) = L ¢>i(s, a)wi = ¢>(s, a)T w . 
i=l 
Let <I> be a matrix with the basis functions evaluated at 
all points similar to the one in the previous section, but 
now <Pis of size (ISIIAI x k). If we knew the transition 
model and reward function, we could, in principle, com­
pute the weights w" of Q" by defining and solving the sys­
tem Aw" = b, where A= <J>T(<J>-!P"<J>) andb = <J>TR. 
Since there is no model available in the case of learn­
ing, LSPI uses sample experiences from the environment 
in place of P" and n. Given a set of samples, D = 
{ (sd., ad., s�,, rd.) I i = 1, 2, . . . , L }, LSPI constructs ap-
6 An alternative proof of this theorem can be obtained via the 
conservative non-expansion property of the minimax operator, as 
defined in Szepesvari and Littman (1999). 
proximate versions of <I>, P" <I>, and n as follows: 
¢>(sd, adY ¢>(s�,, 1r (s�,)r ) 
�= ¢>(sd: :�dy M = ¢>(s� , ; (s� W 
rd, 
� � 
Assume that initially A = 0 and b = 0. For a fixed policy 
1r, a new sample (s, a, r, s') contributes to the approxima­
tion according to the following update equations: 
A<--A+¢>(s,a)(¢>(s,a)- !¢>(s',1r(s'))r , 
b <-- b + ¢>(s, a)r . 
The weights are computed by solving Aw" = b. This ap­
proach is similar to the LSTD algorithm (Bradtke & Barto, 
1996). Unlike LSTD, which defines a system of equations 
relating V-values, LSPI is defined over Q-values. Each it­
eration of LSPI yields the Q-values for the current policy 
1r(t), implicitly defining the next policy 7r(t+l) for policy 
iteration as the greedy policy over the current Q-function: 
( ) 
� (t) 1r t+l (s) = argmaxQ-rr<•l(s,a) = argmax¢>(s,a)Tw" . 
aEA aEA 
Policies and Q-functions are never represented explicitly, 
but only implicitly through the current set of weights, and 
they are computed on demand. 
A key feature of LSPI is that it can reuse the same set of 
samples even as the policy changes. For example, suppose 
the corpus contains a transition from state s to state s' U£t 
der action a1 and 7ri(s') = a2. This is entered into the A 
matrix as if a transition were made from ( s, a 1 ) to ( s', a2). 
If 1ri+l ( s') changes the action for s' from a2 to a3, then 
the next iteration of LSPI enters a transition from (s, a!) to 
( s', a3) into the A matrix. Sample reuse is possible because 
the dynamics for state s under action a1 have not changed. 
The generalization of LSPI to Markov games is quite 
straightforward. Instead of learning Q(s, a) functions, 
we learn Q(s, a, o) functions defined as Q(s, a, o) = 
¢>( s, a, o) T w. The minimax policy 1r at any given state s 
is determined by 
1r(s) = argmax min L 1r(s, a)¢>(s, a, o)T w , 
-rr(s) En(A) oEO aEA 
and computed by the solving the following linear program: 
Maximize: 
Subject to: 
V(s) 
L 1r(s,a) = 1 
aEA 
Va E A, 1r(s,a) � 0 
Vo E 0, V(s):::; L 1r(s,a)¢>(s,a,o)Tw 
aEA 
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Finally, the update equations have to be modified to account 
for the opponent's action and the distribution over next ac­
tions since the minimax policy is, in general, stochastic: 
� � 
( 
"\"' ' ' ' ' ' ) T 
A<-- A+¢(s,a,o) ,P(s,a,o)-1 L.. 7r(s ,a )¢(s ,a ,o) , 
a'EA 
b <--- b+ ,P(s,a,o)r , 
for any sample (s, a, o, r, s'). The action o' is the minimiz­
ing opponent's action in computing 7r(s'). 
7 Experimental Results 
We tested our method on two domains that can be modeled 
as zero-sum Markov games: a simplified soccer game, and 
a router/server flow control problem. Soccer, by its nature 
is a competitive game, whereas the flow control problem 
would normally be a single agent problem (either for the 
router or the server). However, viewing the router and the 
server as two competitors (although they may not really 
be) can yield solutions that handle worst-case scenarios for 
both the server and the router. 
7.1 Two-Player Soccer Game 
This game is a simplification of soccer (Littman, 1994) 
played by two players on a rectangular grid board of size 
Rx C. Each player occupies one cell at each time; the play­
ers cannot be in the same cell at the same time. The state 
of the game consists of the positions of the two players and 
the possession of the ball. Initially the players are placed 
randomly in the first and the last column respectively7 and 
the ball is given to either player randomly. There are 5 
actions for each player : up (U), down (D), left (L), right 
(R), and stand (S). At each time step the players decide on 
which actions they are going to take and then a fair coin is 
flipped to determine which player moves first. The players 
move one at a time in the order determined by the coin flip. 
If there is a collision with a border or with another player 
during a move, the player remains in its current position. 
If the player with the ball (attacker) runs into the opponent 
(defender), the ball is passed to the opponent. Therefore, 
the only way for the defender to steal the ball is to be in 
the square into which the attacker intends to move. The at­
tacker can cross the goal line and score into the defender's 
goal, however the players cannot score into their own goals. 
Scoring for the agent results in an immediate reward of + 1, 
whereas scoring for the opponent results in an immediate 
reward of -1, and the game ends in either case. The dis­
count factor for the problem is set to a value less than 1 to 
encourage early scoring. 
7We decided to make this modification in the original game 
(Littman, 1994), because good players will never leave the central 
horizontal band between the two goals (the goal zone) if they are 
initialized within it, rendering the rest of the board useless. 
The discrete and nonlinear dynamics of the game make 
it particularly difficult for function approximation. We 
experimented with a wide variety of basis functions, but 
ultimately settled on a fairly simple, model-free set that 
yielded reasonable policies. We believe that we could do 
better with further experimentation, but these simple basis 
functions are sufficient to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
value function approximation. 
The basic block of our set consists of 36 basis functions. 
This block is replicated for each of the 25 action pairs; each 
block is active only for the corresponding pair of actions, so 
that each pair has its own weights. Thus, the total number 
of basis functions, and therefore the number of free param­
eters in our approximation, is 900. Note that the exact solu­
tion for a 4 x 4 grid requires 12, 000 Q-values, whereas for 
a 40 x 40 grid requires 127, 920,000 Q-values. It is clear 
that large grids cannot be solved without relying on some 
sort of function approximation. 
The 36 functions in the basic block are not always active 
for a fixed pair of actions. They are further partitioned to 
distinguish between 4 cases according to the following bi­
nary propositions: 
P1 "The attacker is closer to the defender's goal than the de­
fender", i.e, there is path for the attacker that permits scor­
ing without interception by the defender. 
P2 "The defender is close to the attacker", which means that 
the defender is within a Manhattan distance of 2 or, in other 
words, that there is at least one pair of actions that might 
lead to a collision of the two players. 
The validity of the propositions above can be easily de­
tected given any state of the game. The basis functions 
used in each of the 4 cases are as follows: 
• P, and not P2 
- 1.0 : a constant term 
- D H P A G D : the horizontal distance8 of the attacker 
from the defender's goal 
- S Dv P A G : the signed vertical distance of the attacker 
from the goal zone 
- DHPAGn x SDvPAG 
• P, and P2 
- 1.0, DHPAGn, SDvPAG,DHPAGD x SDvPAG 
- PAUG: indicator that the attacker is at the upper end 
of the goal zone 
- P A LG : indicator that the attacker is at the lower end 
of the goal zone 
- SDHPAPn: the signed horizontal distance between 
the two players 
- S Dv PAPD : the signed vertical distance between the 
two players 
• not P, and not P2 
- same as above, excluding SDHPAPD 
8 All distances are Manhattan distances scaled to [0, 1]. 
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Figure 1: Number of Wins and Draws for Each Player 
• not P, and Pz 
- DHPAGv, SDvPAG, DHPAGD x SDvPAG, 
PAUG,PALG 
- PvGvL : indicator that the defender is by the goal 
line of his goal 
- Pv WG: indicator that the defender is within the goal 
zone 
- 10 indicators for the 10 possible positions9 of the de­
fender within Manhattan distance of 2 
Notice that all basis functions are expressed in the rela­
tive terms of attacker and defender . In our experiments, 
we always learned a value function from the perspective of 
the attacker. Since the game is zero-sum, the defender's 
weights and value function are simply the negation of the 
attacker's. This convenient property allowed to learn from 
one agent's perspective but use the same value function for 
either offense or defense during a game. 
We conducted a series of experiments on a 4 x 4 grid 
to compare our learned player with the optimal minimax 
player (obtained by exact policy iteration) for this grid size. 
Training samples were collected by "random games", i.e., 
complete game trajectories where the players take random 
actions independently until scoring occurs. The average 
length of such a game in the 4 x 4 grid is about 60 steps. We 
varied the number of games from 0 to 500 in increments of 
50. In all cases, our training sets had no more than 40, 000 
samples. For each data set, LSPI was run until convergence 
or until a maximum of 25 iterations was reached. The final 
policy was compared against the optimal player in a tourna­
ment of 1, 000 games. A game was called a draw if scoring 
did not occur within 100 steps. The entire experiment was 
repeated 20 times and the results were averaged. 
The results are summarized in Figures 1 - 2, with error 
9There are actually 12 such positions, but two of them (the 
ones behind the attacker) are excluded because if the defender 
was there, P1 would be true. 
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Figure 2: Total (discounted) Score for Each Player ("y = 
0.9) 
bars indicating 95% confidence intervals. The player cor­
responding to 0 training episodes is a purely random player 
that selects actions with uniform probability. Clearly, LSPI 
finds better players with more training data. However, 
function approximation errors may prevent it from ulti­
mately reaching the performance of the optimal player. 
We also applied our method to bigger soccer grids where 
obtaining the exact solution or even learning with a conven­
tional method is prohibitively expensive. For these grids, 
we used a larger set of basis functions (1400 total) that 
included several crossterms compared to the set described 
above. These terms were not included in the 4 x 4 case be­
cause of linear dependencies caused due to the small grid 
size. Below are listed the extra basis functions used in ad­
dition to the original ones listed above: 
• P1 and not Pz 
- (DHPAGv?. (SDvPAG? 
- PAUG, PALG, PAWG 
• P1 and Pz 
- (DHPAGv)2, (SDvPAG)2, PAWG 
- SDHPAPD x SDvPAPv 
• not P, and not Pz 
- (DHPAGv)2, (SDvPAG)2, PAWG, SDvPAPv 
- (SDvPAPv)2, (SDHPAPv)2 
- SDHPAPv x SDvPAPv,PvWG 
• not P, and Pz 
- (DHPAGv)2, (SDvPAG)2, PAWG 
We obtained a benchmark player for an 8 x 8 grid by gener­
ating 2 samples, one for each ordering of player moves for 
each of the 201, 600 states and action combinations, and 
by using these artifically generated samples to do a uni­
form projection into the column space of <I?. In some sense, 
this benchmark player is the best player we could hope to 
achieve for the set of basis functions under consideration, 
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Figure 3: 8 x 8 Soccer: Discounted Total Score, 'Y = 0.8 
assuming that uniform projection is the best one. Our anec­
dotal evaluation of this player is that it was very strong. 
We conducted a series of experiments against learned play­
ers obtained using training sets of different sizes. Training 
samples were again collected by "random games" with a 
maximum length of 1, 000 steps. The average length was 
about 180 steps. We varied the number of such games from 
0 to 2, 000 in increments of 500. In all cases, our train­
ing sets had no more than 400, 000 samples. For each data 
set, LSPI was run until convergence, typically about 8 iter­
ations. The final policy was compared against the bench­
mark player in a tournament of 1, 000 games. A game was 
called a draw if scoring had not occurred within 300 steps. 
Average results over 10 repetitions of the experiment are 
shown in Figure 3. Again, LSPI produces a strong player 
after a relatively small number of games. 
To demonstrate generalization abilities we took all policies 
learned in the 8 x 8 grid and we tested them in a 40 x 40 
grid. Our anecdotal evaluation of the benchmark player in 
the 40 x 40 grid was that played nearly as well as in the 
8 x 8 grid. The learned policies also performed quite rea­
sonably and almost matched the performance of the bench­
mark player as shown in Figure 4. Note that we are com­
paring policies trained in the 8 x 8 grid. We never trained a 
player directly for the 40 x 40 grid since random walks in 
this domain would result mostly in random wandering with 
infrequent interaction between players or scoring, requiring 
a huge number of samples. 
7.2 Flow Control 
In the router/server flow control problem (Altman, 1994), 
a router is trying to control the flow of jobs into a server 
buffer under unknown, and possibly changing, service con­
ditions. This problem can be modeled as an MDP with the 
server being an uncertain part of the environment. How­
ever, to provide worst-case guarantees the router can view 
0.05 
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Number of Training Episodes 
Figure 4: 40 x 40 Soccer: Discounted Total Score, 'Y = 0.8 
the server as an opponent that plays against it. This view­
point enables to router to adopt control policies that per­
form well under worst-case/changing service conditions. 
The state of the game is the current length of the buffer. 
The router can choose among two actions, low (L) and 
high (H), corresponding to a low (PAL) and a high (P AH) 
probability of a job arrival to the buffer at the current time 
step, with 0 < PAL < P AH � 1. Similarly, the server 
can choose among low (L) and high (H), corresponding 
to a low (PDL) and a high (PDH) probability of a job 
departure from the buffer at the current time step, with 
0 � P D L < P D H < 1. Once the agents pick their ac­
tions, the size of the buffer is adjusted to a new state ac­
cording to the chosen probabilities and the game continues. 
The immediate cost R( s, a, o) for each transition depends 
on the current state s and the actions a and o of the agents: 
R(s, a, o) = c(s) +a x PAa + {3 x PD0, 
where c( s) is a real non-decreasing convex function, a � 
0, and {3 :0::: 0. c( s) is related to the holding cost per time 
step in the buffer, a is related to the reward for each in­
coming job, and {3 is related to the cost for the quality of 
service. The router attempts to minimize the expected dis­
counted cost, whereas the server strives to maximize it. The 
discount factor is set to 0.95. 
Under these conditions, the optimal policies can be shown 
to have an interesting threshold structure, with mostly de­
terministic choices and randomization in at most one state 
(Altman, 1994). However, the exact thresholds and prob­
abilities cannot be easily determined analytically from the 
parameters of the problems which might actually be un­
known. These facts make the problem suitable for learning 
with function approximation. We used a polynomial of de­
gree 3 (1.0, s, s2, s3) as the basic block of basis functions to 
approximate the Q function for each pair of actions. That 
resulted in a total of 16 basis functions. 
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Figure 5: Flow Control: Performance Against the Optimal. 
We tested our method on a buffer of length 100 with: 
PAL = 0.2, PAH = 0.9, PDL = 0.1, PDH = 0.8, 
c(s) = 10-4s2, a = -0.1, {3 = +1.5. With these set­
tings neither a full nor an empty buffer is desirable for ei­
ther player. Increasing the buffer size beyond 100 does not 
cause any change in the final policies, but will require more 
training data to cover the critical area (0-100). 
Training samples were collected as random episodes of 
length 100 starting at random positions in the buffer. Fig­
ure 5 shows the performance of routers and servers learned 
using 0 (random player), 1, or 5 training episodes (the er­
ror bars represent the 95% confidence intervals). Routers 
are tested against the optimal server and servers are tested 
against the optimal router.10 Recall that the router tries 
to minimize cost whereas the server is trying to maxi­
mize. With about 100 or more training episodes the learned 
player is indistinguishable from the optimal player. 
8 Conclusions and Future Work 
We have demonstrated a framework for value function ap­
proximation in zero-sum Markov games and we have gen­
eralized error bounds from MDPs to the Markov game case, 
including a variation on the optimal stopping problem. A 
variety of approximate MDP algorithms can be general­
ized to the Markov game case and we have explored a 
generalization of the least squares policy iteration (LSPI) 
algorithm. This algorithm was used to find good policies 
for soccer games of varying sizes and was shown to have 
good generalization ability: policies trained on small soc­
cer grids could be applied successfully to larger grids. We 
also demonstrated good performance on a modest flow con­
trol problem. 
10The "optimal" behavior for this problem was determined by 
using a tabular representation and an approximate model obtained 
by generating 1000 next state samples for each Q-value. 
One of the difficulties with large games is that it is diffi­
cult to define a gold standard for comparison since evalua­
tion requires an opponent, and optimal adversaries are not 
known for many domains. Nevertheless, we hope to attack 
larger problems in our future work, particularly the rich va­
riety of flow control problems that can be addressed with 
the Markov game framework. Queuing problems have been 
carefully studied and there should be many quite challeng­
ing heuristic adversaries available. We also plan to consider 
team-based games and general sum games. 
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